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UNITED STATES SUPPORTS IRANIAN ARBITRATION OVER PUBLIC 
POLICY AGAINST TRANSACTING WITH IRAN 
 
Megan Hill* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cubic’s dispute with Iran goes back to 1977, when it entered into a contract to sell and 
service an Air Combat Maneuvering Range for use by the Iranian Air Force. Like other military 
items, however, the system went undelivered after the Iranian revolution of 1979.1 The ICC 
awarded compensation to the Ministry of Iran. The Ministry subsequently filed a motion for 
prejudgment interest covering the period between the ICC’s final award and the district court’s 
confirmation.2 The district court held that the ICC’s arbitral award was valid but denied the 
motion for attorneys fees and prejudgment interest.3 The United States has a strong public policy 
toward the confirmation of foreign arbitration awards that outweighs current restrictive trade 
policies with Iran. Also, prejudgment interest and legal fees are available in an arbitration 
confirmation award under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards.4 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Contractual History 
On October 23, 1977, Cubic International Sales Corporation, predecessor in interest to 
appellant Cubic Defense Systems, Inc. (“Cubic”), a United States corporation, contracted with the 
Ministry of War of the government of Iran, predecessor of appellees Ministry of Defense and 
Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Ministry”), for sale and service of 
an air combat maneuvering range for use by Iran’s military.5 The Contracts provided for progress 
payments upon completion of specified portions of work, pursuant to which Iran paid Cubic 
$12,608,519 under the Sales Contract and $302,857 under the Service Contract as of October 4, 
1978.6 
                                                     
* Megan Hill is an Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2013 Juris Doctor 
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Kenneth Ofgang, Ninth Circuit Upholds Arbitration Award in Favor of Iran, METROPOLIAN NEWS-
ENTERPRISE (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.metnews.com/articles/2011/iran121611.htm. 
2 Ministry of Def. & Support v. Cubic Def. Sys., 29 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1172 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 
3 Ministry of Def. & Support v. Cubic Def. Sys., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *5 (9th Cir. Cal. Dec. 15, 
2011). 
4 Steve Cox, Ministry of Defense of Iran v. Cubic Defense, WILLIAMETTE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW 
(Dec. 15, 2011), http://willamettelawonline.com/2011/12/ministry-of-defense-of-iran-v-cubic-defense/. 
5 Ministry of Def. & Support v. Cubic Def. Sys., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *3 (9th Cir. Cal. Dec. 15, 
2011). 
6 Ministry of Def. & Support v. Cubic Def. Sys., 29 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 
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In 1978 and early 1979, political unrest and revolution developed in Iran, resulting in the 
Shah’s departure from Iran and the return from exile of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.7 The 
former Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, ruled the Imperial Republic of Iran form 1953, 
when he assumed control of the government, until shortly before his death in 1979.8 Unrest 
developed and intensified in Iran during the Shah’s rule and the Shah appointed the Prime 
Minister to head a regency council and left the country.9 Meanwhile, exiled religious leader 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned and brought about the collapse of the Prime Minister’s 
regime. The Ayatollah was then vested with the final authority to rule and established the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.10 The Iranian Revolution resulted in the nonperformance of the contracts.11 
Ministry alleged that Cubic breached both Contracts by removing its service specialists 
from Iran and by failing to deliver the military system and equipment.12 Cubic alleged that in 
February and March of 1979, Cubic sent Ministry notices of completion of Milestone 3 of the 
Sales Contract and demanded payment of $5,403,651. According to Cubic, Ministry did not 
respond to these notices, accept delivery, or make payment. Ministry then claimed that after the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979, Cubic sold the goods to a third party, retained the sale proceeds, and 
failed to notify Ministry of the possibility of resale on August 3, 1979.13 Consequently, the parties 
agreed in 1979 that the contracts would be discontinued and that Cubic would try to resell the 
equipment, with a later settlement of the accounts and in 1981, Cubic sold a modified version of 
the equipment to Canada.14 
In 1982, the Ministry filed breach of contract claims against Cubic with the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal at the Hague.15 In 1987, the tribunal issued an order stating that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the matter.16 Pursuant to the Sales and Service Contracts, in 1991, the 
Ministry filed a request for arbitration before the International Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).17 Article 15 of the Sales Contract and Article 18 of 
the Service Contract both state that “[a]ny controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or relating 
to [these contracts] or breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in the City of Zurich, 
Switzerland, in accordance with the laws of the Government of Iran in effect as of the date of 
[these contracts].”18 
Ministry and Cubic appointed their respective Arbitrators in 1992, and the ICC appointed 
a Panel Chair on May 6, 1993. On July 14, 1993 the Parties attended a pre-hearing conference at 
which the Terms of Reference for the Arbitration were decided.19 The ICC ordered bifurcation of 
the dispute, deferring the issue of quantification of the claim and counterclaim. A hearing was 
then held on all issues except for the quantification pursuant to the ICC’s previous Order.20 In 
                                                     
7 Id. 
8 Minister of Defense of Islamic Republic v. Gould, Inc., 887 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. Cal. 1989). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11  Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *4. 
12 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1171. 
13 Id. 
14 Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *4. 
15 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1171. 
16 See Ministry of Nat’l Def. of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gov’t of the United States, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 276, 1987 WL 503814 (1987). 
17 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1171. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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1995, the ICC Tribunal issued an Order finding that the Ministry’s claim for reimbursement and 
Cubic’s counterclaim were not time-barred by the Iranian statute of limitations and that the 
bifurcation of the proceedings was no longer applicable.21 The ICC made a final award in May 
1997. The final award makes a net award of $2,808,519 plus pre-award interest in favor of the 
Ministry. The ICC also directed Cubic to reimburse the Ministry $60,000 for arbitration costs.22 
The ruling was issued by the Panel Chair, with dissents from both Arbitrators. One Arbitrator 
dissents on the ground that Ministry is entitled to more relief than awarded and the other 
Arbitrator dissents in judgment finding for Cubic.23  
In June 1998, after Cubic failed to pay, the Ministry filed a petition in federal district 
court to confirm the ICC’s award under the New York Convention.24 The district court issued an 
order granting the Ministry’s petition. The Ministry subsequently filed a motion for prejudgment 
interest covering the period between the ICC’s final award and the district court’s confirmation. 
The motion also requested attorney’s fees based on Cubic’s alleged failure to comply with the 
ICC’s decision.25 The district court denied the motion, concluding that prejudgment interest and 
attorney’s fees were unavailable in an action to confirm a foreign arbitration award under the 
Convention.26 
The district court entered judgment in August 1999. Cubic appealed confirmation of the 
award and the Ministry cross appealed denial of prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees.27 
B. Background on the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards seeks 
to provide common legislative standards for the recognition of arbitration agreements and court 
recognition and enforcement of foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards. The term “non-
domestic” appears to embrace awards which, although made in the state of enforcement, are 
treated as “foreign” under its law because of some foreign element in the proceedings.28 The 
Convention’s principal aim is that foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards will not be 
discriminated against and it obliges parties to ensure such awards are recognized and generally 
capable of enforcement in their jurisdiction in the same way as domestic awards. An ancillary 
aim of the Convention is to require courts of Parties to give full effect to arbitration agreements 
by requiring courts to deny the parties access to court in contravention of their agreement to 
refer the matter to an arbitral tribunal.29 
The United States became a party to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“Convention”) in 1970, and Congress soon after 
enacted legislation implementing the provisions of the Convention into domestic law, codified as 
                                                     
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 1172. 
23 Id. 
24 Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *4 (citing 9 U.S.C. s 207). 
25 Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *5. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at *5-6. 
28 1958 - Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards - the "New York" 
Convention, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html (last updated 
2012). 
29 Id. 
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Chapter II of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), Pub.L. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970).30 A 
district court’s “review of a foreign arbitration award is quite circumscribed.”31 There is a 
general pro-enforcement bias under the Convention.32 
The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral 
of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention.33 The grounds for 
refusing to recognize or enforce an arbitral award include: 
 
(a) The parties to the agreement…were, under the law applicable to them, under some 
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have 
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the 
award was made; or 
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of the arbitrator or the arbitration proceedings ro was otherwise unable 
to present [his or her] case; or 
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not failing within the terms 
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope 
of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted 
to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part the award which 
contain decision on matter submitted to arbitration may be recognized and 
enforced.34 
III.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Cubic’s Argument in District Court 
1. Article V(1) (c) 
On June 25, 1998, the Ministry filed its petition for an order confirming the ICC’s award. 
Cubic cross-motioned for an order vacating the award on October 9, 1998.35 The district court 
considered their decision pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards. Considering its early precedent in the case, Ministry 
of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., the court determined that it shall 
confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or 
enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention.36 Section 10 of the FAA and case law 
addressing domestic arbitration set forth grounds upon which a court may refuse to confirm an 
                                                     
30 Codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208. 
31 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1172 (citing Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
v. Gould, Inc., 969 F.2d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
32 Id. 
33 Ministry of Defense, 969 F.2d at 770 (citing 9 U.S.C. §207).  
34 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1172 (citing the United Nations Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June 1958)). 
35 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1172. 
36 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1172 (citing Ministry of Defense, 969 F.2d at 770 (citing 9 U.S.C. 
s 207)). 
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arbitration award. These grounds, however, are not applicable to confirmation under the 
Convention.37 
Cubic’s first argument is that the ICC award violates Article V(1) (c) of the Convention 
because it deals with differences not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the 
submission to arbitration and it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission 
to arbitration.38 In addition, Cubic alleges that the award violates Article (1) (c) because it ignores 
the terms of the Parties’ Contracts and therefore any decision which exceeds the scope of that 
jurisdictional reference is improper.39 Cubic takes issue with the following legal theories: 
 
(1) The conclusion that the Parties agreed in 1979 to discontinue the 
Contracts at least for the time being, i.e., until the results of 
Cubic’s attempt to resell the System would be known (Award s 
10.11); 
(2) The conclusion that there was an “implicit agreement for the 
postponement of the maturity date of any such claims until Cubic 
has resold the equipment or declared its inability to resell” 
(Procedural Order No. 6 s 1.3); 
(3) The conclusion that there was “a factual termination of the 
contracts at the request of Iran” (Award s 11.22); and 
(4) The finding that it can be implied from the Termination for 
Convenience Clause that “Cubic shall credit Iran with…products 
manufactured for Iran prior to the termination of the Contracts” 
(Award s 13.6).40 
 
Cubic argues that the Tribunal decided issues not submitted by the Parties and issued a 
ruling based upon legal theories not contemplated and/or asserted by the Parties.41 
 
Cubic also disputes the Tribunal’s reference to the Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts and to principles of fairness, including good faith and fair dealing.42 Cubic 
argues that these references violate Article V(1) (c) because the principles exceed the scope of the 
Terms of Reference.  
2. Article V(1) (a) 
Article V(1) (a) provides that a court may refuse to confirm an arbitral award if an 
agreement in writing, including an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, is not 
valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it.43 Cubic argued that the four theories of 
the Tribunal that Cubic contests constitute oral amendments to the Contracts’ arbitration clauses 
                                                     
37 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1172. 
38 Id. at 1173. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1174. 
43 Id. 
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and Terms of Reference and therefore violate the Convention’s requirement that the agreements 
be in writing.  
3. Article V(1) (b) 
Article V(1) (b) allows a court to refuse confirmation of an arbitral award if the “party 
against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the 
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present [his or her] case.”44 
Cubic argues that it was denied a meaningful opportunity to present its case because 
 
(1) The Ministry shifted its factual and legal theories throughout 
the proceedings; 
(2) The Tribunal issued interim decisions regarding bifurcation 
of the proceedings; and 
(3) The legal theories and remedies articulated in the award 
were not previously presented.45 
B.  District Court’s Opinion 
1. Article V(1) (c) 
The district court reasoned that the Terms of Reference allow the Arbitrators leeway in 
resolving the conflict that the Parties presented to them. The questions posed for the Arbitrators 
were presented in the following manner in the Terms of Reference: 
 
The issues to be determined shall be those resulting from the Parties’ 
submissions and which are relevant to this adjudication of the Parties’ 
respective claims and defenses. In particular, the Arbitral Tribunal may 
have to consider the following issues (but not necessarily all of these or 
only these, and not necessarily in the following order)….46 
 
The Arbitrators were neither required to consider all of the disputes nor limited to the 
issues listed, but could consider additional issues in resolving this dispute.47 The Court reasoned 
that the award is within the parameters of those twelve issues, even if the legal theories applied 
are different from those presented in the Parties’ pleadings.48 Therefore the use of legal theories 
not presented by the Parties is acceptable under the Terms of Reference.49 
In response to Cubic’s argument that the use of legal theories not presented by the Parties 
precludes confirmation of the award, the Court held that under the Convention, a court is to 
                                                     
44 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1175. 
45 Id. 
46 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1173. 
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48 Id. 
49 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1174. 
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determine “whether the award exceeds the scope of the [arbitration agreement], not whether the 
award exceeds the scope of the parties’ pleadings.50 The subject matter of this dispute is the 
Service and Sales Contract between Cubic and the Ministry, which the ICC award resolves and 
although not based on the same legal theories as stated in the pleadings cannot be a basis for 
refusing to confirm it.51  
The court determined that the reference to the Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts or the reference to equitable principles does not exceed the scope of the Terms of 
Reference.52 That Cubic disagrees with the Tribunal’s response to the applicability of 
international law is not a reason to find that the Tribunal addressed issues beyond the scope of the 
Terms of Reference.53 This Court’s discretion in reviewing a foreign arbitration award is 
circumscribed.54 The principles were applied within the terms of the submission to arbitration and 
therefore the court ruled that the award granted by the Tribunal does not violate Article V(1) 
(c).55 
2. Article V(1) (a) 
The Tribunal has the task of resolving the dispute over the Contracts between the 
Ministry and Cubic. The district court held that the court cannot refuse to confirm the award 
simply because the legal theories and conclusions presented in the award differ from those 
contemplated by the Parties in their pleadings.56 Legal theories used by adjudicators to resolve 
contract disputes are not considered oral amendments to the contract or the arbitration 
agreement.57 The district court ruled that the award does not violate Article V(1) (a). 
3. Article V(1) (b) 
The district court determined that even if Cubic’s allegations were true, Cubic’s claims 
do not rise to the level required by Article V(1) (b) to justify a refusal to confirm the award.58 The 
district court reasoned that Cubic’s active participation in the entire process demonstrates 
notification of the proceedings.59 In addition, Cubic was also able to present its case and therefore 
Cubic had its day in court and had ample opportunity to present its interpretation of the facts and 
its legal theories to the Tribunal.60 The district court ruled that the award did not violate Article 
V(1) (b). 
                                                     
50 Id. at 1174 (citing Ministry of Defense, 969 F.2d at 771). 
51 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1174. 
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53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Ministry of Def. & Support, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1174. 
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IV.  COURT OF APPEALS 
A. Cubic’s Argument 
1. Public Policy 
Cubic contends that the district court erred by confirming the ICC’s award because 
confirmation is contrary to the public policy of the United States. The Convention’s public policy 
defense, Article V(2) (b) states: 
  
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may…be refused if the 
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought 
finds that…(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to 
the public policy of that country.61 
 
 Cubic argues that confirmation of the ICC’s award is contrary to a fundamental public 
policy of the United States against trade and financial transactions with the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.62 Cubic demonstrates this policy by referencing several sanctions the United States has 
imposed on Iran.63 Cubic claims that the sanctions prohibit Cubic from paying the ICC’s award 
unless the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issues a specific 
license.64 Cubic extends the policy against payment of an award to confirmation of an award.65 
Although the sanctions do not specifically prohibit the confirmation of the award, Cubic sees 
them as evidence of a comprehensive United States policy against trade, investment, and 
economic support for Iran that makes even confirmation of the ICC’s award repugnant to the 
public policy of the United States.66 
 Cubic cites Bassidji v. Goe to support its argument. In that case the court considered the 
scope and purpose of a set of sanctions prohibiting virtually all trade with and investment in Iran 
by a United States person.67 The court suggested that any “transfer of wealth to Iran,” or any 
“payment [that] would provide funds to the Iranian economy,” would violate the “fundamental 
purposes,” if not necessarily the letter, of the regulations.68 
 In the alternative, Cubic argues that confirmation of the ICC’s award is contrary to the 
public policy of the United States because “affirmance of the judgment would put Cubic in the 
nightmare position of being subject to an apparently enforceable judgment when Cubic and any 
of its involved agents would commit crimes by paying or allowing payment.”69 
                                                     
61  Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *10 (citing N.Y. Convention, art. V(2)). 
62 Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *11. 
63 See Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 535; Iranian Transactions regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560; 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 544. 
64 Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *12. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at *13 (citing Bassidji v. Goe, 413 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
68 Id at *14 (citing Bassidji, 413 F.3d at 935, 939). 
69 Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *20. 
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2. ICC Award not Binding 
Cubic argues that the ICC award has not become binding on the parties.70 Under the 
Convention: 
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the 
request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party 
furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and 
enforcement is sought, proof that…(e) the award has not yet become 
binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a 
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
the award was made.71 
3. Not a Money-Judgment 
Cubic contends the district court’s judgment is not a money judgment and is therefore not 
subject to postjudgment interest because it does not specify the dollar amount of the arbitration 
award.72 Cubic argues that postjudgment interest should be tolled because Cubic has been 
prevented, through no fault of its own, from paying the judgment after it was confirmed by the 
district court.73 
B. Court of Appeal’s Opinion 
1. Public Policy 
The Court of Appeals recognized that there is a presumption of favoring international 
arbitration awards under the Convention and therefore construed the public policy defense 
narrowly.74 The defense only applies when confirmation or enforcement of a foreign arbitration 
award “would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.”75 The court 
held that the public policy in support of the recognition of foreign arbitration awards carries more 
weight than the regulatory restrictions governing payment of the ICC’s award.76 The United 
States has a strong public policy favoring the confirmation of foreign arbitration awards.77 The 
goal of the Convention and the subsequent American adoption of it, was to encourage the 
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and 
to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and awards are enforced in 
                                                     
70 Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *21. 
71Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *22 (citing N.Y. Convention, art. V(1)). 
72 Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *23. 
73 Id. at *25. 
74 Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *10 (citing Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. 
v. Societe generale De L’Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
75 Id. at *11. 
76 Id. at *14. 
77 Ministry of Def. of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 969 F.2d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting 
Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
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signatory countries.78 The Court of Appeals determined that in order for Cubic to prevail, Cubic 
must demonstrate a countervailing public policy sufficient to overcome the presumption favoring 
upholding foreign arbitration agreements.79 
The Court of Appeals held that Cubic did not meet its burden. The court reasoned that the 
sanctions against relations with Iran do not preclude the confirmation of the ICC award.80 The 
Iranian Assets Control Regulations do not prohibit payment, let alone confirmation, of the ICC 
award.81 The court also reasoned that although Cubic argues that the regulations prohibit payment 
absent a license, there is a great difference between payment and confirmation.82 Confirmation of 
the award transfers no wealth to Iran and therefore confirmation does not violate the public policy 
against economic support for the government of Iran.83 Payment is subject to licensing rather than 
barred absolutely, and therefore the court held that confirmation should not be refused because 
payment is prohibited when payment may in fact be authorized by the government’s issuance of a 
specific license.84 The fact that the license can be issued supports the confirmation of the award.85 
The court also reasoned that the applicable regulations provide general licenses authorizing legal 
representation of Iran in legal proceedings in the United States relating to disputes between Iran 
and a United States national.86 Although the regulations do not expressly authorize confirmation 
of the award in favor of Iran, the regulations show that legal proceedings to resolve disputes such 
as this one are, short of payment of a judgment, not in conflict with United States sanctions 
policy.87 Lastly, the United States government’s confirmation that the ICC’s award comports with 
the national and foreign policy of the United States is entitled to great weight.88 For the previous 
reasons the Court of Appeals held that confirmation of the ICC’s award is not contrary to the 
public policy of the United States under Article V(2) (b) of the Convention.89 
                                                     
78 Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at * 14(quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 
U.S. 506, 520 (1974)). 
79 Id. at *15. 
80 The Iranian Assets Control Regulations block the transfer of certain property in which Iran has an interest. A 
general license, however, authorizes the transfer of property interests acquired after January 1981. See 31 C.F.R. § 
535.579 (a). The Supreme Court has already held that Iran’s interests in this case are covered by that general license. 
See Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 556 U.S. 366 (2009). 
81 Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *16. 
82 Id. 
83 See Nat’l Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F.Supp. 800, 820 (D.Del. 1990) (“Although Sun Oil argues that 
confirmation of this award would mean that U.S. dollars would end up financing Qadhafi’s terrorist exploits, the Court 
has already pointed out tha the President is empowered to prevent any such transfer through the Libyan Sanctions 
Regulations.”). 
84 Br. of the United States as Amicus Curiae 3-4 (“if this Court affirms the confirmation of the award, the 
Treasury Department can issue a license requiring Cubic to make any payment satisfying the judgment into a blocked 
account held in the Ministry’s name by a U.S. financial institution.”). 
85 See Belship Navigation, Inc. v. Sealift, Inc., No. 95 CIV. 2748, 1995 WL 447656, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 
1995) (“Any award that Belship might recover through arbitration would be placed in a ‘blocked’ interest bearing 
account until relations with Cuba improve to the point where the funds may be released to Belship. Allowing 
arbitration to proceed will hardly violate the United States’ ‘most basic notions of morality and justice.’”). 
86 See 31 C.F.R. § 544.507 (a) (3) (authorizing “legal services to…persons whose…interests in property are 
blocked,” for the “[i]nitiation and conduct of domestic U.S. jursidction”). 
87 Ministry of Def. & Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24839 at *18, *19. 
88 Id. at *19. 
89 Id. at *20. 
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The Court of Appeals also addressed Cubic’s alternative argument and ruled that there is 
no showing that the judgment is unpayable because a license can be issued.90 If however the court 
confirmed an unpayable award, the affected party could seek a stay of execution of judgment.91 
2. Binding Effect of ICC Award 
The Court of Appeals holds that Cubic argument that the ICC award has not become 
binding on the parties is without merit.92 An arbitration award becomes binding when “no further 
recourse may be had to another arbitral tribunal (that is, an appeals tribunal).”93 The court 
reasoned that Cubic does not dispute that all arbitration appeals have been exhausted in this 
case.94 Thus the award has become binding and Article V(1) (e) does not apply.95 
3. Money-Judgment 
The governing statute provides that “interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in 
a civil case recovered in a district court.”96 The Court of Appeals adopted the Third Circuit’s 
definition of money judgment.97 Under this definition, a money judgment consists of two 
elements: “(1) an identification of the parties for and against whom judgment is being entered, 
and (2) a definite and certain designation of the amount which plaintiff is owed by defendant.”98 
The court compared this case with EEOC v. Gurnee Inns, Inc. In EEOC v. Gurnee Inns, Inc., 956 
F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1992), the district court ordered the defendant to pay specified sums to a 
number of employees, “less appropriate payroll deductions.”99 The Seventh Circuit rejected the 
defendant’s argument that this was not a money judgment, stating: “the awards did not lose their 
character as sums certain simply because they were subject to the mechanical task of computing 
the payroll deduction.100 In this case, the court held that although the judgment does not spell out 
the amount of the ICC’s award, a definite and certain designation of the amount that Cubic owes 
the Ministry is readily discernible by looking to the arbitration award itself.101 The Court of 
Appeals ruled that the judgment of the district court satisfied both elements of a money judgment. 
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In addition to Cubic’s alternative argument that Cubic has been prevented from paying 
the judgment, the Court reasoned that the plain language of §1961 forecloses that argument.102 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Ministry is therefore entitled to postjudgment interest.103 
4. Post-award/Prejudgment Interest and Attorney’s fees 
The Ministry argued that the district court abused its discretion by denying the Ministry’s 
motion for post-award, prejudgment interest covering the period following the ICC’s final award 
in May 1997.104 The district court concluded it lacked authority to award prejudgment interest.105 
The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred.106 First the court reasoned that “[w]hether 
to award prejudgment interest in cases arising under federal law has in the absence of a statutory 
directive been placed in the sound discretion of the district courts.”107 Secondly, the court 
reasoned that nothing in the federal statutes implementing the Convention, or in the Convention 
itself, reveals any intention on the part of Congress or the contracting states to preclude post-
award, prejudgment interest.108 The court also reasoned that nothing restricts the court’s 
jurisdiction over collateral issues such as prejudgment interest and therefore falls within the 
district court’s discretion.109 Lastly, because the losing party has an incentive to withhold 
payment, the absence of authority to grant post-award, prejudgment interest would be a result 
contrary to the purposes of the Convention.110 The Court of Appeals held that federal law allows 
a district court to award post-award, prejudgment interest in actions under the Convention.111 
The Ministry also argued that the district court abused its discretion when it denied the 
Ministry’s motion for attorney’s fees based on what it contends was Cubic’s willful bad faith in 
failing to abide by the ICC’s award.112 The district court denied the request because it concluded 
that it lacked jurisdiction.113 The Court of Appeals reasoned that federal courts have authority to 
award attorney’s fees when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons.”114 Accordingly the Court of Appeals held that federal law permits an award 
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of attorney’s fees in an action under the Convention.115 Because the district court did not believe 
it had the authority, it did not address the Ministry’s allegations that Cubic acted in bad faith. 
Therefore the case is remanded to the district court.116  
V.  IMPLICATIONS 
The Court of Appeals ruling in favor of confirming the ICC’s arbitral award further 
demonstrates the strong public policy in favor of arbitration. Public policy is one of seven 
defenses to the confirmation of an arbitration award under the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, known as the “New York Convention.”117 In this case, 
with support from the United States government’s amicus brief, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit determined that the public policy in favor of confirming international arbitral 
awards outweighs the public policy against transacting with Iran. 
The Court’s ruling also enforces the goals and purpose of the Convention. Chapter 2 of 
Title 9 of the United States Code contains the New York Convention and the enabling legislation 
by which it was ratified by the United States in 1970. The goal of the New York Convention is to 
facilitate international business transactions by promoting enforcement of arbitral agreements in 
contracts involving international commerce.118 The Convention requires courts in subscribing 
countries to enforce arbitration awards as if the awards were made in that country, subject to 
limited grounds on which enforcement may be refused.119 
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) states that agreements to arbitrate…shall 
be valid irrevocable, and enforcement.120 This policy favoring agreements to arbitrate and the 
enforcement of arbitral awards extends to a policy favoring the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, relations between the United States and Iran have 
been hostile. Since 1995, the United State has had an embargo on trade with Iran.121 Sanctions 
against transacting with Iran have continued to be renewed and extended by the United States 
causing further tension between the two nations. However the result of this dispute and the 
confirmation of the arbitral award in favor of the Ministry of Iran, further exemplifies the strong 
public policy that outweighs even the decade’s worth of sanctions placed against any economic 
transactions that would benefit Iran. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the United State’s public policy against transacting with Iran, the Court of 
Appeals confirmed the ICC award in favor of Iran. Although public policy is one of seven 
defenses to the confirmation of an arbitration award under the Convention on the Recognition and 
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Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, known as the “New York Convention,” the Court of 
Appeals hereby furthers the goals of fostering international business by confirming international 
arbitration awards. Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s ruling exemplifies the United State’s strong 
policy favoring the confirmation of international arbitration awards.  
 
 
